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Negotiations to form a coalition in politics appear in any parliamentary democracy. Many studies on lit-
erature deal with coalition formation games. Starting point of this paper is based on a model on political
coalition formation. In this model, two diﬀerent procedures of coalition formation between political parties
are considered. In the ﬁrst approach, a step-by-step procedure is used and new members are added one-by-
one. In the second approach, a simultaneous procedure is applied in which members in a coalition decide
and negotiate simultaneously. Furthermore, when the players are political parties, many diﬀerent decision
variables play a role in the game. A government is deﬁned as consisting of a majority coalition and a policy
supported by this coalition. Because of the diﬀerent party positions on diﬀerent topics, a multidimensional
decision space is considered in which each party has an ideal position and the coalition policy is formed.
When considering multidimensional space and a large number of parties, computational methods become an
important tool to ﬁnd which stable government(s) is(are) in equilibrium. We analyse and develop computa-
tional algorithms for both procedures. Diﬀerent cases in political games are used to illustrate the methods
and data is used to test hypotheses on coalition formation.
Key words :
1. Introduction
The topic of coalition formation is widely studied in literature. This paper focuses on a model
described in de Ridder and Rusinowska (2005) of multidimensional coalition formation in politics.
In the model, a government consists of a majority coalition and a policy supported by this coalition.
There are n parties trying to form a government. A formed government has a policy agreement
represented in a m-multidimensional Euclidean policy space Rm. The complexity increases with
the number of parties n and the dimension of the policy spaces m. Given the number of parties
n and policy dimension m, computational methods are necessary to compute all possible winning
coalitions and preferences of parties over those (if many) coalitions. Furthermore, two ways of
forming a government are considered: step-by-step and simultaneously. Each procedure requires a
speciﬁc algorithm.
In de Ridder et al. (2007) the model is used to show that procedure plays an important role in
reaching a coalition agreement and that political parties do not necessarily beneﬁt from being a
ﬁrst-mover. Moreover, that study shows that a decrease in a party's ﬂexibility can be beneﬁcial
in coalition negotiations. Hypotheses on power sharing tactics are also investigated. In the current
paper, we develop methods to study the two dynamical aspects of coalition formation (procedure
and policy ﬂexibility) and report on the ﬁndings for testing hypotheses by analysing the formal
model and deducing implications from this model based on real-life data. The computational aspects
of both the model and the empirical test are discussed.
In Section 1.1, the model is embedded in literature on application of Game Theory in political
coalition formation. In Section 1.2, theoretical backgrounds about the multidimensional spatial
coalition formation model are outlined. In Section 1.3, the procedures to form a coalition and
complexity of both are introduced. In Section 2, the algorithms for two diﬀerent procedures of
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coalition formation are described. In Section 3, hypotheses are formulated and checked based on
Dutch political data. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 4.
1.1. Game Theory in Political Coalition Formation
In multi-party democracies, political parties have to form coalitions to achieve majority govern-
ments. As a part of coalition negotiations, coalition members bargain and agree on a package of
policy agreements, the coalition agreement (see Timmermans (2003) for an extensive discussion on
coalition agreements). In 63% of the coalition formations in Western-Europe studied by Müller and
Strøm (2003), such coalition agreements were reached (in e.g. Austria, Ireland, Belgium, and The
Netherlands). In order to reach such a coalition agreement, parties in the coalition will have to make
compromises as each party has its own ideal policy. Only by adjusting their policy positions, parties
can reach the compromise needed for the coalition agreement.
An important subject is the procedure used to reach a coalition. Roughly speaking, two diﬀerent
ways of coalition formation can be discerned: a step-by-step or hierarchical procedure versus a
simultaneous or non-hierarchical procedure (Laver and Schoﬁeld (1990)). The step-by-step approach
sees coalition formation as a process in which the group incrementally forms: new members are
added gradually. An alternative approach is to negotiate immediately with all the members of
the coalition, as in a simultaneous procedure. In spite of these two diﬀerent procedures which are
recognized in the literature and which both occur in real life coalition formation, little attention
has been paid to the consequences of these procedures for the result of coalition formation. Some
earlier theoretical results show that procedure plays an important role in coalition formation and
that, except for some special situation, diﬀerent procedures lead to diﬀerent results (de Ridder and
Rusinowska (2005)). The special conditions require that the ideal positions of the players are really
close, which is unrealistic in a political setting. The model introduced in de Ridder and Rusinowska
(2005) is positioned among spatial coalition models (based on Downs (1957), see e.g. Grofman
(1982); Laver and Shepsle (1996)) and has been applied to alliance formation between ﬁrms.
The ﬁeld of research of formal coalition models is large and extensive, see, amongst others, Axelrod
(1970), Vries (1999), Martin and Stevenson (2001), Grofman (1982), Laver and Shepsle (1996),
van Deemen (1989), von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), and Warwick (1998). So far, most of
those studies have focused on why coalition form and, based on that, which parties will cooperate.
Arguments for coalition formation were found in power, policy, or institutional arguments. However,
the strategy and process of coalition formation have been ignored in the literature (Laver and
Schoﬁeld (1990): how will coalitions be formed, and, what is the best strategy for a party during the
process of coalition formation? Also, from a more formal theoretical point of view, several authors
have pointed at this lack of dynamics in the models (Arnold and Schwalbe (2002); Tohmé and
Sandholm (1999); van Deemen (1997)). It seems unnatural to analyse coalition formation with a
static approach, since coalition formation is clearly dynamic in nature: for example, parties need
a few weeks, sometimes months, to reach a coalition agreement, diﬀerent procedures are used to
form a coalition, and parties move their positions to be able to compromise. The suggestion that
process plays a role in coalition formation - and should thus be included as an explanatory variable
- is strengthened by earlier research (Austen-Smith and Banks (1988); Baron (1993); Bloch (1996);
Brams et al. (2005); de Ridder and Rusinowska (2005)). This earlier research has not evolved towards
a coherent and empirically veriﬁed stream of research, and, moreover, the role of procedure has been
ignored.
1.2. The Model
We deal with the following model of spatial coalition formation, considered in de Ridder and Rusi-
nowska (2005). There are n players, here political parties, which try to form a majority coalition S
and to decide about a policy of the coalition xS hereafter called the coalition position. This coalition
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position is the formal representation of the policy agreement of a coalition. Party i ∈ N , where
N denotes the set of all parties, has a weight wi > 0, which is based on the number of seats in
parliament party i possesses.
Each party i may choose a policy position xi from an m-multidimensional Euclidean policy space
Rm, m≥ 1. A distance between two positions xi = (xi1, ..., xim) and xj = (xj1, ..., xjm) is given by
d(xi, xj) =
√√√√ m∑
k=1
(xik−xjk)2. (1)
Parties have a certain amount of ﬂexibility on the policy positions, i.e., they have their preferences
deﬁned in Rm. Each player i ∈ N is assumed to have an ideal position x∗i ∈ Rm, which is the
most preferred position of party i, and a maneuvering space, an equivalent of the policy horizon
by Warwick (2000), which consists of all positions acceptable to party i. The model assumes the
maneuvering space to be a ball in Rm. Mi denotes the maneuvering space of party i with middle
point x∗i and radius ri, i.e.,
Mi = {y ∈Rm | d(x∗i , y)≤ ri}. (2)
The maneuvering space of a party is then the set of policy positions with distances from the ideal
position of the party not greater than the radius. Of course, some positions are more preferred to a
party than others. Preferences of a party on positions are expressed by the following rule: the closer
a position is to the ideal position of a party, the more preferred this position is to the party.
Given coalition S ⊆N and the ideal positions x∗i for i ∈ S, all parties of the potential coalition
S have to agree on a coalition position for S. We consider two alternative procedures for forming
a coalition and choosing a coalition position for that coalition. Although the procedures diﬀer from
each other, there are two common assumptions for these procedures. First of all, it is assumed that
no party will agree on a position which does not belong to its maneuvering space as these positions
are unacceptable for a party. In other words, the necessary condition for a coalition S to be formed
is a non-empty intersection of the maneuvering spaces of all members of S (we call this a feasible
coalition), i.e., ⋂
i∈S
Mi 6= ∅,
and of course, the position xS of the formed coalition S must belong to this intersection as there
has to be commonality in positions, i.e.,
xS ∈
⋂
i∈S
Mi.
A similar assumption is adopted in the policy-horizon model: 'With horizons, there are deﬁnite
limits to the willingness of parties to compromise on policy in order to participate in government;
beyond those limits, parties would prefer to remain in opposition' (Warwick, 2000, 39).
An illustration of the model in a three-party, two dimensional example is given in Figure 1. Based
on the preferences rule, the valuation (loss) of a party i when a winning coalition S is formed,
denoted by ΠSi , is deﬁned as follows:
ΠSi (xS) = d(x
∗
i , xS) (3)
In Section 1.3, both procedures are outlined.
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Figure 1 Illustration of the model.
1.3. Coalition formation process
Now, our approach takes a diﬀerent course from the one adopted by Warwick. To ﬁnd a solution
to the basic coalition formation model, we consider and compare two procedures: a step-by-step
procedure and a simultaneous procedure. These two procedures coincide with the distinction in
political science literature between hierarchical and non-hierarchical coalition formation (Laver and
Schoﬁeld (1990)). So far, spatial coalition theories have most often neglected the diﬀerent procedure
of forming a coalition (as in Grofman (1982) who studies one procedure, but see Brams et al. (2005),
and Bloch (1996) who do consider the consequences of diﬀerent procedures). In de Ridder and
Rusinowska (2005), it has formally been proven that it matters which procedure is adopted, and
also that there is no procedure which is always better.
The ﬁrst kind of procedure, the hierarchical view, sees ` ... coalition building as a process in
which actors with similar policy preferences ﬁrst get together in some sort of provisional alliance
and, only after this has been done ..., do they cast around for other coalition partners, adding these
until the formation criterion is satisﬁed' (Laver and Schoﬁeld (1990), p. 140). The proto-coalition
model of Grofman (1982) is such a hierarchical model. In the model we present here, the step-by-
step procedure is a hierarchical procedure. Although it is diﬃcult to look behind the often closed
doors of coalition negotiations, e.g. Ireland, Belgium, and Denmark have known instances of this
step-by-step approach (Müller and Strøm (2003)).
In the step-by-step procedure, the ﬁrst step is that two parties (e.g. party 1 and 2) negotiate.
These two will reach an agreement if their maneuvering spaces overlap and hence a ﬁrst coalition
position x{1,2} is agreed on. This coalition position is determined by choosing a position in the
intersection of their maneuvering spaces and taking the weights of the players into account. That
is, a big party can pull the coalition position more towards its ideal. To be more precise, when
determining x{1,2}, ﬁrst, parties 1 and 2 each choose a position (called the negotiation position)
in the intersection of the maneuvering spaces such that the distance of that position to the ideal
point of the party is minimal. These negotiation positions are denoted with x˜1 and x˜2. The coalition
position x{1,2} is the gravity center (a weighted average) of the negotiation positions.
Now, a third party (3) joins the negotiations. Players 1 and 2 operate as proto-coalition {1,2},
and an agreement with 3 is only reached if the maneuvering spaces of 1, 2, and 3 overlap. If so,
coalition {1,2,3} with position x{{1,2},3} is formed, which is the gravity center of the negotiation
positions of the proto-coalition {1,2} and party 3. This process continues with adding new parties
until a majority coalition S with position xS has been reached, where S denotes an order, a set of
parties, that indicates the sequence that leads to coalition S. In de Ridder and Rusinowska (2005),
it has been proven that this step-by-step procedure leads to a unique and Pareto eﬃcient solution.
Hence, one coalition position is reached such that there is no other position in the intersection of
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the maneuvering spaces that is more preferred by all members of the coalition. An illustration of
the step-by-step procedure of forming a three-party coalition is given in Figure 2.
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Figure 2 The step-by-step procedure.
Second, we also ﬁnd a non-hierarchial approach which considers coalition formation as a one-step
procedure. Laver and Shepsle (1996) generalize political coalition formation as a process in which
one party proposes a particular cabinet, which can be vetoed by all its members. In such a case,
there are no proto-coalitions which form intermediate steps before a deﬁnitive coalition is reached.
Non-hierarchical coalition formation is a process in which all the parties of a coalition sit round the
table to negotiate simultaneously. In the overview of coalition formation in Western-Europe, Müller
and Strøm (2003) report many instances of such a way of bargaining.
In our model, the simultaneous procedure looks as follows. If parties 1,2, and 3 form coalition
{1,2,3}, their coalition position is x{1,2,3}. A coalition forms if maneuvering spaces of all three
parties overlap. The coalition position will be in the intersection of their three maneuvering spaces
and will depend on the weights of the players. The position x{1,2,3} is the gravity center of the
negotiation positions of all parties in question. More general, the simultaneous procedure of forming
a majority coalition S results in a position xS of the coalition. Again, it has also been proven that
this procedure leads to a unique and Pareto optimal solution (de Ridder and Rusinowska (2005)).
An illustration of the simultaneous procedure of forming a three-party coalition is given in Figure
3.
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Figure 3 The simultaneous procedure.
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Beware that although both the step-by-step procedure and the simultaneous procedure can study
a coalition with for instance parties 1,2, and 3, their respective outcomes are usually diﬀerent 1.
According to the step-by-step procedure, coalition {1,2,3} can form in three diﬀerent ways: ﬁrst
a bilateral agreement with two parties and then the third party 1,2 or 3 respectively joins. The
simultaneous procedure predicts just one way of forming the coalition: all negotiate together. Hence,
in spite of a cooperation between the same three parties, four diﬀerent paths to form a coalition
and four diﬀerent coalition positions are discerned: x{{1,2},3}, x{{1,3},2}, x{{2,3},1}, and x{1,2,3}.
Calculations have shown that the number of diﬀerent paths and coalition positions can increase
dramatically. In a coalition game with ten parties, 210− 11 = 1013 diﬀerent 10-party coalitions are
possible. However, when taking diﬀerent procedures into account, 4932045 diﬀerent step-by-step
coalitions can be discerned plus 1013 simultaneously formed coalitions. In sum, if ten parties play a
coalition game, there are 4933058 diﬀerent ways of forming a coalition. Figure 4 shows the diﬀerent
paths and coalitions to analyse in a case with only 3 parties.
Figure 4 Number of paths and coalitions.
In this way there are n!
2
possible paths each represented by a permutation of n parties. The number
of diﬀerent paths of forming a coalition S is |S|!
2
. The number L of coalitions in a step-by-step
procedure can be calculated:
L = C2n +C
2
n ∗ (n− 2) + . . .+C2n ∗ (n− 2) ∗ . . . ∗ (n− (n− 2)) ∗ (n− (n− 1))
=
n!
2
×
n∑
k=2
1
(n− k)! (4)
Compared to the step-by-step procedure, the simultaneous procedure has only one path to be
followed. It models the situation where |S| parties are sitting together to come to an agreement.
Besides the grand coalition, there are many possible partial-coalitions. The more parties, the more
possible coalitions can be formed. The number K of possible coalitions is given by:
1When the ideal positions of two parties starting the coalition formation process belong to the intersection of the
maneuvering spaces of the three parties, the step-by-step procedure with the given parties' order of forming a coalition,
and the simultaneous procedure lead to the same position for the coalition.
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K =C2n +C
3
n + . . .+C
n
n =
n∑
k=2
Ckn = 2
n− (n+ 1) (5)
Table 1 shows how complexity increases with the number of players (parties) in both procedures.
Table 1 Number of coalitions following diﬀerent procedures.
step-by-step simultaneous
Number of parties Possible paths Number of Coalitions Number of Coalitions
2 1 1 1
3 3 6 4
4 12 30 11
5 60 160 26
6 360 975 57
7 2520 6846 120
8 20160 54796 247
9 181440 493200 502
10 1814400 4932045 1013
Disregarding some special conditions, the two procedures usually lead to diﬀerent positions for
the coalition and consequently diﬀerent appreciations by the coalition members. Given the distance
between the ideal position of a party and the coalition position, parties will have a preference
ranking over the diﬀerent positions of the coalitions, over the diﬀerent coalitions, and hence over
the procedures to reach them. The closer a coalition agreement is to the ideal position of a party,
the more this party will prefer this coalition agreement. In this way, we show that parties should
not only form preferences over coalitions, but should also take the procedure into consideration. In
conclusion, the procedure of coalition formation should be a strategic resource in coalition formation
and should play a role in coalition negotiations similar to the composition of the coalition.
2. Algorithms for the diﬀerent procedures
The coalition compromise diﬀers for each diﬀerent path in the step-by-step procedure. According
to the all-coalition-path conﬁguration, one can calculate the agreement points of all coalitions and
corresponding valuations by following the procedure described in the next section. An index l is
used to distinguish coalition. A coalition S in a step-by-step formation is an ordered subset of N .
A coalition S in a simultaneous formation is a subset of N . Table 2 summarises the notation used.
Table 2 Notation.
N Set of parties
i, j Index of parties
L Total number of coalitions
l coalition index
x∗i Ideal position for party i
Sl A coalition, |Sl| ≥ 2, Sl ⊆N
xSi Negotiation position of party i when coalition S is formed
xS Compromise coalition position of S
x
S∪{i}
S Negotiation position of a coalition S when party i joins
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2.1. Forming a Coalition Step-by-Step
Consider two parties, i and j, forming a coalition S = {i, j}. By proposition 3.1 in de Ridder and
Rusinowska (2005), the negotiation positions for the two parties are calculated as follows. The
negotiation position for party i is: if rj <d(xi, xj),
xSi = x
∗
j + rj ×
x∗i −x∗j
d(x∗i , x∗j )
(6)
otherwise,
xSi = x
∗
i (7)
where the negotiation position of j is given by switching i and j in (6) and (7). Once the parties
have deﬁned their negotiation positions, the compromise position is calculated by
xS =
wi×xSi +wj ×xSj
wi +wj
(8)
Let S be a coalition with p members, p≥ 1. The compromise position of the coalition is xS. If
party i joins the coalition, both, the coalition S and the party i have to choose new negotiation
positions: X
S∪{i}
S and x
S∪{i}
i respectively. Next step is to agree on a compromise coalition position
XS∪{i}. To choose the new negotiation positions, the problem to solve is:
x
S∪{i}
i = arg min
z∈⋂j∈S∪{i}Mj d(x
∗
i , z) (9)
x
S∪{i}
S = arg min
z∈⋂j∈S∪{i}Mj d(X
S, z) (10)
The compromise position for the new coalition S ∪{i} is calculated as follows:
xS∪{i} =
wi×xS∪{i}i +XS∪{i}S ×
∑
j∈S wj∑
j∈S wj +wi
(11)
Based on the model by de Ridder and Rusinowska (2005) we introduce a procedure to determine
the compromise (agreement) points and valuations of all coalitions at each possible path. In this
procedure, (see Algorithm 1) ﬁrst the negotiation positions and compromise points for all the possible
two-party coalitions are computed. Procedure 2 is used to compute the negotiation positions. For
each two-party coalition S, the procedure builds up the coalition adding one-by-one new members. If
the maneuvering spaces of the new member i and the members of S overlap, the negotiation positions
(for the new member and the coalition) are computed (Procedure 3). If the new coalition S ∪ {i}
is a winning coalition, then valuations for each member are calculated. For the computation of (9)
and (10), Procedure 3 uses an external non-linear programming algorithm, fmincon. Additionally,
a penalty approach is used to check whether or not an intersection (feasible area) exists between
the maneuvering spaces of the negotiating parties. Given potential coalition S, we minimise over x
the penalty function
F (x) = max
j∈S
(d(x∗i , x)− ri) (12)
If the result is negative the intersection is nonempty.
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Algorithm 1 Step-by-Step algorithm.
Funct Step-by-Step(Ideal positions of parties, X; Radius for each party, R; weights, voting power, W ; quota q;
number of parties, n and dimension, m)
1. l := 0
2. L := n!/2 ∗∑nk=2 1/(n− k)! . number of possible coalitions
3. for each two-party coalition . Compute new positions and negotiation points for all the possible two-party
coalitions
4. if Mi ∩Mj 6= ∅
5. l := l+ 1
6. Sl := {i, j}
7. NSl :=N\Sl
8. [x
{i,j}
i , x
{i,j}
j ] := Neg-Pos2(x
∗
i , x
∗
j )
9. XGl =
wi×x{i,j}i +wj×x
{i,j}
j
wi+wj
10. if
∑
i∈Sl wi > q
11. for i∈ Sl
12. Πli = d(x
∗
i ,X
G
l )
13. for k = 1 to L−n
14. while j ∈NSk AND
⋂
i∈SlMi ∩Mj 6= ∅
15. l := l+ 1
16. Sl := Sk ∪{j}
17. NSl :=NSk\{j}
18. [xSlj ,X
G
k ] := Negotiation(x
∗
j ,X
G
k )
19. XGl =
wj×xSlj +
∑
i∈Sk wi×X
G
k∑
i∈Sl wi
20. if
∑
i∈Sl wi > q
21. for i∈ Sl
22. Πli = d(x
∗
i ,X
G
l )
23. OUTPUT: {Coalitions, compromise positions and valuations of winning coalitions}
Algorithm 2 Computes negotiation positions for parties and coalition position.
Funct Neg-Pos2(Ideal positions for each of the two parties: x∗i , x
∗
j )
1. New position for party i
2. if rj < d(xi, xj)
3. x
{i,j}
i = x
∗
j + rj × x
∗
i−x∗j
d(x∗i ,x
∗
j )
4. else
5. x
{i,j}
i = x
∗
i
6. New position for party j
7. if ri < d(xi, xj)
8. x
{i,j}
j = x
∗
i + ri× x
∗
j−x∗i
d(x∗i ,x
∗
j )
else
9. x
{i,j}
j = x
∗
j
10. OUTPUT: {New positions for the parties and coalition position: x
{i,j}
i , x
{i,j}
j }
Algorithm 3 Computes new negotiation positions for coalition and new member (party).
Funct Negotiation(Ideal position for the new member i, x∗i , of the new coalition S ∪{i} and compromise position of
coalition S, XS)
1. objfun=objective function; objcon=objective constraints;x0=starting point
2. if Mi ∩⋂j∈SMj 6= ∅
3. x
S∪{i}
i = Fmincon(objfun, objcon,x0, x
∗
i )
4. X
S∪{i}
S = Fmincon(objfun, objcon,x0,X
S)
5. OUTPUT: {New negotiation positions for party i and coalition S}
2.2. Forming a Coalition Simultaneously
Let S ⊆N be a coalition andMi(xi, ri) for i∈ S be maneuvering spaces in Rm such that ∩i∈SMi 6= ∅.
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1. Each party i∈ S chooses the negotiation position xSi :
xSi = arg min
z∈⋂j∈SMj d(x
∗
i , z) (13)
2. Coalition position xS is chosen as gravity center of positions x
S
i with weights wi:
xS =
∑
j∈S wjx
S
j∑
j∈S wj
(14)
Algorithm 4 is the main procedure when coalitions are formed simultaneously. It computes the
winning coalitions, its coalition positions and valuation-preferences for the parties. First, it generates
all possible coalitions based on 0−1 notation: 0 means the party is not a member; 1 means the party
is a member of the coalition. If the coalition is winning and the maneuvering spaces of the members
overlap, the algorithm calls a second procedure (Algorithm 5) to compute the negotiation positions
of the members. Algorithm 5 uses an external non-linear programming algorithm to calculate the
positions. Back in the main algorithm, the coalition position and valuations are computed in order
to generate a preference order.
Algorithm 4 Simultaneous algorithm.
Funct Simult(Ideal positions of parties, x∗; Radius for each party, r; weights, voting power, w; quota q; number of
parties, n and dimension, m)
1. number of possible coalitions: L := 2n− (n+ 1)
2. for k = 1 to L . Compute new positions and negotiation points for all the feasible coalitions
3. Generate coalition Sk
4. if
∑
i∈Sk wk > q and
⋂
i∈SkMi 6= ∅
5. for i∈ Sk
6. xSki := Neg-Sim(x
∗)
7. XGk =
∑
i∈Sk wi×x
Sk
i∑
i∈Sk wi
8. Πki = d(x
∗
i ,X
G
k )
9. OUTPUT: {Coalitions, new party and negotiation positions for the simultaneous procedure}
Algorithm 5 Procedure to compute new negotiation positions for members in coalition S.
Funct Neg-Sim(Ideal position for the party i, x∗i )
1. objfun=objective function; objcon=objective constraints;x0=starting point
2. xSi = Fmincon(objfun, objcon,x0)
3. OUTPUT: {New negotiation positions for party i}
2.3. Numerical Illustration
We provide an example here to illustrate how the algorithms and model work. This example uses
the Dutch election result of 2003 (Klingemann et al. (2006)). As input for the model, we need ideal
policy positions of Dutch parties, and a weight and a radius for each political party. The ideal
policy positions are derived from a data set with policy positions of Dutch political parties on 56
dimensions from 1998 and 2003 (Klingemann et al. (2006)). Because the model is working with
spherical maneuvering spaces based on distance calculations, the data is all scaled between 0 and
10. The weight of the parties is determined by the amount of seats each party had in parliament
(total of 150 seats). The radii that model the ﬂexibility of the parties is relatively arbitrary for
illustrative purposes and leave a degree of freedom for our analysis. In reality, each party has its
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own radius which is dependent on the speciﬁc situation and which might be subject to change. In
this case we have used similar radii for all parties. The names of the parties are the following:
CDA - Christian Democrats (Christen Democratisch Appel)
CU - Christian Union (Christen Unie)
D66 - Democrats 66 (Democraten '66)
GRL - Green Left (Groen Links)
LPF - List Pim Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn)
PvdA - Labor Party (Partij van de Arbeid)
SP - Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij)
VVD - People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
(Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie)
Note that the SGP (Political Reformed Party) is not included in this table, as it was not included
in the dataset from Klingemann et al. (2006) (in Klingemann et al. (2006), Appendix IV, is explained
that the election program for the collection of data was missing).
Table 3 Data for 2003.
Parties
CDA CU D66 GRL LPF PvdA SP VVD
Radius 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Weight 44 3 6 8 8 42 9 28
As output of the model, we only consider coalition positions of majority coalitions of parties
that have an overlap of their maneuvering spaces given their ideal policy positions, i.e. of feasible
winning coalitions. As said earlier, the biggest party gets the initiative for coalition formation in
The Netherlands. In 2003, this was the CDA. The majority coalitions with overlapping maneuvering
spaces containing CDA are included in Table 4. For each coalition reached with a certain procedure,
the distance between the coalition position and the ideal position of the party are calculated. The
{PvdA, CDA} coalition leads to the same coalition position with both procedures as no third party
joins here. However, for a coalition between CDA, PvdA, and LPF (e.g. {{CDA, PvdA}, LPF} and
{CDA, PvdA, LPF}) procedure plays a role as diﬀerent procedures lead to diﬀerent distances. More
generally, we see in all the calculations done for this paper that procedure really makes a diﬀerence:
diﬀerent procedures lead to diﬀerent results.
Table 4 Distances from ideal points for 2003 example.
Step-by-Step Procedure
Coalition Seats Distance
CU D66 GRL PvdA SP VVD LPF CDA
{CDA,PvdA} 86 - - - 20.52 - - - 20.07
{{CDA,PvdA}, SP} 95 - - - 24.92 29.39 - - 26.92
{{CDA,PvdA},LPF} 94 - - - 25.45 - - 29.24 23.69
{{CDA,SP}, PvdA} 95 - - - 26.04 29.42 - - 25.97
{{CDA,LPF},PvdA} 94 - - - 25.38 - - 29.15 23.86
Simultaneous Procedure
CU D66 GRL PvdA SP VVD LPF CDA
{CDA,PvdA} 86 - - - 20.52 - - - 20.07
{CDA,PvdA,SP} 95 - - - 26.01 29.00 - - 26.47
{CDA,PvdA,LPF} 94 - - - 25.31 - - 28.62 24.59
Based on these distances, the preferences of the players can be calculated. The closer the coalition
position to the ideal position of a party, the more the party will prefer this coalition and the
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procedure. Table 5 reports this. As an example, CDA's most favorite option is to cooperate with
PvdA. If CDA would cooperate with PvdA and SP, then the best procedure for CDA would be to
negotiate ﬁrst with SP alone. The step-by-step procedure with SP joining as last is CDA's least
preferred procedure for this coalition. Note that we do not consider preferences of the parties not
participating in the coalition.
Table 5 Preference order for 2003.
Step-by-Step Procedure
Coalition Seats Preference order
CU D66 GRL PvdA SP VVD LPF CDA
{CDA,PvdA} 86 - - - 1 - - - 1
{{CDA,PvdA}, SP} 95 - - - 2 2 - - 7
{{CDA,PvdA},LPF} 94 - - - 5 - - 3 2
{{CDA,SP}, PvdA} 95 - - - 7 3 - - 5
{{CDA,LPF}, PvdA} 94 - - - 4 - - 2 3
Simultaneous Procedure
CU D66 GRL PvdA SP VVD LPF CDA
{CDA,PvdA} 86 - - - 1 - - - 1
{CDA,PvdA,SP} 95 - - - 6 1 - - 6
{CDA,PvdA,LPF} 94 - - - 3 - - 1 4
In reality, the coalition that formed was {CDA, VVD, D66}. Although it is not the aim of this
paper to predict which coalitions have occurred, we can explain why this coalition did not appear in
the results. According to the model and, in particular, the adopted input, this coalition would not
be viable. That means that the adopted radii did not lead to an overlap of the parties' maneuvering
spaces; the {CDA, VVD, D66} coalition is less acceptable than the coalitions that appear in the
table.
3. Hypothesis Testing
The described model and introduced computational method was used in de Ridder et al. (2007) to
do an extensive study to test hypotheses derived from intuition with the aid of Dutch data. The rest
of this paper reports on the ﬁndings. First we formulate the hypotheses and the Dutch situation as
a platform of analysis. After that we point wise discuss the results that can be found in de Ridder
et al. (2007).
3.1. Procedure: Hypothesis on First Mover
Empirical observations of how coalitions form show that procedures are in some countries standard
and formalized in laws (e.g. Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands, Müller and Strøm
(2003)). That diminishes the opportunity for parties to use procedure as a strategic means during
the coalition process. An important observation is that many multi-party democracies have the
(unwritten) law that the party that came out of the elections as the largest gets the initiative (from
a head of state) for forming a coalition. Examples of countries in which this (more or less frequently)
happens are The Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg (Müller and
Strøm (2003)). The idea behind this is that these initiative taking parties are supposed to lead the
negotiations and to have an advantage in the bargaining situation. The earlier a party is involved
in coalition negotiations, the more this party is able to pull the negotiations towards its own ideas.
In this way, this party can determine and inﬂuence the negotiations more and can get advantage
out of it. This brings us to the ﬁrst hypothesis: Being a ﬁrst-mover in coalition negotiations is
advantageous.
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3.2. Flexibility Hypothesis
The second innovation of our model, is the ﬂexibility during negotiations we attribute parties via
maneuvering spaces. In the literature of coalition formation models, it has most often been assumed
that political parties have a ﬁxed position in policy space (Grofman (1982); Vries (1999)). However,
more scholars begin to acknowledge the importance of studying the dynamics of party competition
(Laver (2005); Timmermans (2003), van der Brug (1999)): `...positions are not frozen or ﬁxed;
parties move in the policy space in diﬀerent directions over time' (Timmermans (2003), p. 9). Here,
we concentrate on dynamics of policy positions not with vote maximizing as goal (as e.g. Budge
(1994); Enelow and Hinich (1984); Laver (2005)), but dynamics due to coalition formation.
The idea is that in order to form a coalition, political parties will move their policy position,
but only to a certain limit (Warwick (2000)) as formalized by the maneuvering space. Coalition
formation implies making a coalition agreement: a compromise between the members of a coalition
on the ideological course of the coalition, consisting of a position for the coalition. As a consequence,
parties participating in a coalition need to adjust their position in order to reach such an agreement
(also see Martin and Vanberg (2004)). It is not likely that parties will cooperate with a party which
has opposing policy ideals. We therefore assume parties will only be willing to compromise if they
can stay within their maneuvering space of acceptable positions.
The question now rises what is mostly in a party's interest: a big or small maneuvering space?
When forming a two-party coalition, the answer is straightforward: being less ﬂexible is never
disadvantageous. If a coalition consists of only two parties, the more ﬂexible party of the two will
be forced to move its position more than the other. One can speak of a zero-sum situation: what
one wins, is lost by the other.
Nonetheless, when forming a k-party coalition, for k≥ 3, the answer is less easy. Intuitively, one
would consider that staying closer to a party's ideal position is also better in multi-party coalitions.
Hence, a decrease in ﬂexibility would always be in a party's advantage. However, this is less easy to
analyse due to the amount of players involved. Therefore, we use the data and theoretical results to
study whether the following (second) hypothesis holds: Being less ﬂexible in coalition negotiations
is more advantageous.
3.3. Sharing Power: Hypothesis on Minimal Winning
As a ﬁnal point, we study the role of sharing power. Coalition formation has long been considered
as a combination of achieving power, and simultaneously sharing this power with coalition partners.
Coalition formation is therefore a delicate balance between on the one hand getting this power by
compromising into the coalition, and on the other hand, forming a coalition which gives a party
relatively the best power. In this tradition, the minimal winning (von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944)) and minimum size theory (Riker (1962)) have been formulated. Minimal winning coalitions
are coalitions that contain enough members to be winning, but are not oversized. Minimal win-
ning coalitions cannot miss any member without becoming losing. Minimum size coalitions contain
enough weight to be winning, but not more than that.
In line with this, one could reason that oversized coalitions imply sharing power with more partners
and hence compromising with more partners than necessary. The chance is bigger that a coalition
position will be reached which is farther from a party's ideal position. Less members in a coalition
make it easier to reach an agreement which is closer to a party's ideal point. Hence hypothesis 3a:
Being in a smaller (winning) coalition is more advantageous than being in an oversized coalition.
In a similar way, we can argue that forming a coalition with a stronger partner is not advantageous,
since the stronger party may `pull' the position of a formed coalition more towards it's own ideal
position. Hence we propose hypothesis 3b: Increase of a party's weight is disadvantageous for its
coalition partners.
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3.4. Dutch Situation and Data
In The Netherlands, coalition governments are the standard, considering that the Dutch multi-party
democracy only has had coalition governments since 1945 (Müller and Strøm (2003)). Also, The
Netherlands has a tradition of majority coalitions. Furthermore, two of the issues we highlight -
procedures and ﬂexibility - are important. Concerning procedures, the process of coalition formation
is by far the longest in Western Europe with an average of 70.6 days. This could denote an important
role for procedures. The ﬁrst mover issue is relevant as it is characteristic for the Dutch coalition
practice that the biggest party gets the initiative to form a coalition. Concerning ﬂexibility, coalition
agreements play an important role in coalition negotiations: each cabinet agrees on such a document
as the course of action during their period of government. Data however show diﬀerent ideal policy
positions of Dutch parties (e.g. Vries (1999); van der Brug (1999)) which implies compromises and
hence ﬂexibility of parties. As explained in Section 2, the radii that model the ﬂexibility of the
parties is relatively arbitrary for illustrative purposes and leave a degree of freedom for our analysis.
Due to the lack of empirical data on this aspect, we have taken two diﬀerent ways to determine the
radius: a radius similar for each party and a radius diﬀerent for each party, randomly generated. In
the case (as in the case of Section 2) in which we have used similar radii for all parties, the radii
have been determined by optimizing the case such that enough, but not too many, instances were
found which could help us investigate the hypotheses.
To run the model with real-life multidimensional data, one needs computational algorithms.
We have performed calculations with the model using data from Dutch politics, and, moreover,
we present some theoretical results. Both the empirical and theoretical calculations provide some
counter-intuitive situations which show that certain expectations do not always hold. Also, we il-
lustrate that certain traditions in real-life coalition formation are not necessarily advantageous.
During the paper, we study which strategic moves are advantageous for a potential coalition
member. Advantageous is deﬁned in terms of preference of a party over a coalition and the path
to reach this coalition. This is measured by taking the distance from the ideal position of the
party to the position of the coalition compromise. The closer the coalition position, the better. The
policy-distance eﬀect on government composition, meaning that the incentive of a party to join a
parliamentary coalition government decreases with the distance between the policy position and the
position of the government, was elaborated and tested in particular by Warwick (1998).
3.5. Results on Procedure
Two diﬀerent procedures of coalition formation, leading to diﬀerent coalition positions, are under
study. The research question is whether being a ﬁrst-mover is always advantageous for a party in
coalition negotiations, as in real-life the biggest party, after elections, is most often rewarded with
the initiative for coalition negotiations.
In the 2003 case presented in Section 2, we indeed saw that for the LPF being the ﬁrst mover
was advantageous. When comparing the LPF's preference on the two step-by-step procedures it is
involved in, it prefers {{CDA, LPF}, PvdA} over {{CDA, PvdA}, LPF}. So, it prefers being a ﬁrst
mover over being a late mover. A small counter example can be found due to the PvdA that in
the same coalition prefers to step in later. The data of 1998 and Table 3.5 show a stronger counter
example, as can be observed from Table 3.5.
Table 6 Weights and radius 45 for 1998 data
Parties
GRL SP PvdA D66 VVD CDA
Radius 45 45 45 45 45 45
Seats 11 5 45 14 38 29
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Table 7 Preference order for 1998 data
Step-by-Step Procedure
Coalition Seats Preference order
GRL SP PvdA D66 VVD CDA
{{PvdA,SP},CDA} 79 - 8 3 - - 2
{{PvdA,D66},CDA} 88 - - 5 7 - 4
{{PvdA,CDA}, SP} 79 - 4 1 - - 7
{{PvdA,CDA},D66} 88 - - 2 4 - 8
{{{PvdA,SP},D66},CDA} 93 - 5 10 9 - 6
{{{PvdA,SP},CDA},D66} 93 - 1 7 8 - 9
{{{PvdA,D66}, SP},CDA} 93 - 9 11 5 - 6
{{{PvdA,D66},CDA}, SP} 93 - 7 8 1 - 10
{{{PvdA,CDA}, SP},D66} 93 - 2 6 8 - 9
{{{PvdA,CDA},D66}, SP} 93 - 7 5 2 - 10
Simultaneous Procedure
GRL SP PvdA D66 VVD CDA
{PvdA,SP,CDA} 79 - 3 4 - - 1
{PvdA,CDA,D66} 88 - - 9 3 - 3
{PvdA,D66, SP,CDA} 93 - 6 12 6 - 5
In the 1998 case, PvdA was the biggest party and had to take the initiative in coalition nego-
tiations. For the three party coalition {PvdA, SP, CDA}, two step-by-step and one simultaneous
procedures were considered as PvdA always had to be a ﬁrst mover. In the two step-by-step proce-
dures, CDA would be better oﬀ being a late instead of a ﬁrst mover. Let i denote the preference
relation of party i. For this coalition, the preference order of CDA is as follows: {PvdA, SP, CDA}
CDA {{PvdA, SP}, CDA} CDA {{ PvdA, CDA}, SP}. This also holds for SP, which in case of
step-by-step formation rather joins as last member in the negotiations.
We can therefore conclude that hypothesis 1 does not hold:
Result 1: Being a ﬁrst mover is not always advantageous.
3.6. Results on Flexibility
As a second major point, focus is on policy ﬂexibility of parties. One of the central assumptions of
the model is that parties have maneuvering spaces which reﬂect their ﬂexibility to deviate from their
ideal positions. No party will accept a coalition position which lies outside its maneuvering space.
This assumption is similar to the one made in a policy-horizon model by Warwick (2000), 2005a,
2005b). We study the hypothesis Being less ﬂexible in coalition negotiations is more advantageous.
A search in the data did not provide a counter example to this hypothesis. It was found that a
decrease in a party's ﬂexibility always seems to be in the party's advantage. In other words, the
intuition which was provided earlier holds. As seen more easy in two-party coalitions, less ﬂexibility
always leads to a more advantageous coalition agreement for a party. Although we did not ﬁnd a
counter-example in the Dutch data, we did come up with a one-dimensional theoretical example
which shows that being less ﬂexible can be a disadvantage.
Example 1We consider a three-party example, in which parties 1 and 2 have the same weight,
while the weight of party 3 is twice as big as the weight of party 1 and 2, i.e.
N = {1,2,3}, w1 =w2, w3 = 2w2
The situation is illustrated in Figure 5. Since this is a one-dimensional example, the ideal positions
x∗1, x
∗
2 and x
∗
3 are points (denoted in Figure 5 by squares) on a line, while the maneuvering spaces
M1, M2 and M3 are intervals (denoted in Figure 5 by two-headed arrows). We have
x∗1 = 0, x
∗
2 = 4, x
∗
3 =−2
M.E. Sáiz et al.: On the computation of Negotiation Positions and Preferences in a Spatial Coalition Model
16
All parties are assumed to be equally ﬂexible and their radii are equal to
r1 = r2 = r3 = 6
Hence, the maneuvering spaces are
M1 = [−6,6], M2 = [−2,10], M3 = [−8,4]
and their intersections (also two-headed arrows)
M1 ∩M3 = [−6,4], M1 ∩M2 = [−2,6]
M2 ∩M3 =M1 ∩M2 ∩M3 = [−2,4] 6= ∅.
−10 −8 −6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
M3
M2
M1
M2∩ M3 M1∩ M2∩ M3
M1∩ M3
M1∩ M2
x1
*
x3
*
x2
*
Figure 5 Counter-example being less ﬂexible can be a disadvantage. Ideal points (squares) and maneuvering spaces
(two-headed arrows)
Since M1∩M2∩M3 6= ∅, the necessary condition for coalition {1,2,3} to be formed is satisﬁed. Let
us consider the step-by-step procedure of forming coalition {1,2,3}, in which ﬁrst parties 1 and 2
form a coalition {1,2}, and then party 3 joins. The steps of the procedure are explained in Section
2. The negotiation positions x
{1,2}
1 and x
{1,2}
2 of parties 1 and 2 are equal to their ideal positions,
because the ideal points lie in the intersection of the maneuvering spaces, i.e.
x
{1,2}
1 = 0 = x
∗
1, x
{1,2}
2 = 4 = x
∗
2
Since the weights of parties 1 and 2 are the same and the coalition position is the gravity center of
the negotiation positions, we get
x{1,2} = 2∈M3
Next, party 3 joins proto-coalition {1,2}. Because x∗3 and x{1,2} lie in the intersection of the maneu-
vering spaces, the negotiation positions of party 3 and proto-coalition {1,2} are equal to x∗3 =−2
and x{1,2} = 2, respectively. Since the weight of party 3 is equal to the weight of {1,2}, we get
x{{1,2},3} = 0 = x∗1
Hence, the step-by-step procedure of forming {{1,2},3}, in which ﬁrst parties 1 and 2 form a
coalition, and then party 3 joins, leads to the coalition position x{{1,2},3} which is the best possible
position for party 1.
Next, let us assume that party 1 becomes less ﬂexible, that is, its new radius decreases to r′1 = 3.
All remaining components of the example are unchanged. Then,
M ′1 = [−3,3], M ′1 ∩M2 =M ′1 ∩M2 ∩M3 = [−2,3]
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We consider the same step-by-step procedure of forming {1,2,3} with the new radius r′1 = 3. The
new negotiation position y
{1,2}
1 of party 1 is the same as before (equals x
{1,2}
1 ), since its ideal point
lies in the intersection of the maneuvering spaces. However, the new negotiation position y
{1,2}
2 of
party 2 is diﬀerent, i.e.
y
{1,2}
1 = x
∗
1 = 0, y
{1,2}
2 = 3.
The new position y{1,2}, as the gravity center of y
{1,2}
1 and y
{1,2}
2 with equal weights w1 =w2, is now
y{1,2} =
3
2
∈M3
The new coalition position y{{1,2},3}, as the gravity center of the negotiation positions y{1,2} and
x∗3 =−2, with equal weights for {1,2} and party 3, is now
y{{1,2},3} =−14
Hence, the step-by-step procedure of forming {{1,2},3}, in which ﬁrst parties 1 and 2 form a
coalition, and then party 3 joins, results now in the coalition position y{{1,2},3} which is worse for
party 1 than the coalition position x{{1,2},3}, for the case where party 1 is more ﬂexible, i.e.
x{{1,2},3} 1 y{{1,2},3}
This means that becoming less ﬂexible made party 1 worse oﬀ.
To conclude, although the data have shown that less ﬂexibility always seems to be advantageous
to a party, a theoretical counter example has illustrated how a decrease in ﬂexibility can be a
disadvantage for a party. Hence:
Result 2: When forming a k-party coalition, for k ≥ 3, being less ﬂexible is usually advantageous,
but can theoretically be a disadvantage.
3.7. Results on Sharing Power
Additionally, we study a minor point: the role of sharing power. The question here is whether
striving for a coalition in which a party gets the best relative power position is always advantageous.
Earlier empirical results conﬁrm the role of power-sharing motives of parties (Martin and Stevenson
(2001)), but do not show that oversized can be an advantage for coalition members (cf. Volden
and Carrubba (2004) who explain when oversized coalitions occur). Sub-issues here are the minimal
winning argument (von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)) and the inﬂuence of weight. The minimal
winning argument states that only coalitions will form that have enough members to be winning,
but not more than that. But is a minimal winning coalition necessarily advantageous for a party?
Or, more general, is a smaller coalition necessarily more advantageous than an oversized coalition?
We have found many counter-examples in Dutch data which show that the hypothesis does not
always hold. We consider Dutch data after the 1998 elections (see Table 3.5). Here, we change the
radii for the parties and let the radius be diﬀerent for diﬀerent parties. We get an instance as shown
in Table 3.7. Table 9 shows the preference order for this case. Note that under the step by step as
well as simultaneous procedure, PvdA ﬁnds the non-minimal winning coalition formed by PvdA,
VVD and D66 more attractive than the minimal winning coalition {PvdA, VVD}.
Concluding, we get the following result.
Result 3a: Forming a minimal winning coalition is not always advantageous.
Concerning weight, we like to consider the consequence the weight of a party (number of seats in
parliament) has for its coalitional partners. The last research question is then: Does an increase of
a party's weight imply a disadvantage for its coalition partners?
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Table 8 Weights and diﬀerent radii for 1998
Parties
GRL SP PvdA D66 VVD CDA
Radius 45 55 25 65 85 45
Seats 11 5 45 14 38 29
Table 9 Preference order with diﬀerent radii for 1998
Step-by-Step Procedure
Coalition Number of seats Preference order
GRL SP PvdA D66 VVD CDA
{PvdA,V V D} 83 - - 3 - 1 -
{{PvdA,SP}, V V D} 88 - 4 12 - 5 -
{{PvdA,D66}, V V D} 97 - 10 1 11 6 -
{{PvdA,V V D}, SP} 88 - 8 7 - 4 -
{{PvdA,V V D},D66} 97 - 11 2 10 2 -
{{{PvdA,SP},D66}, V V D} 102 - 1 8 1 12 -
{{{PvdA,SP}, V V D},D66} 102 - 2 11 2 10 -
{{{PvdA,D66}, SP}, V V D} 102 - 6 5 5 12 -
{{{PvdA,D66}, V V D}, SP} 102 - 9 4 7 11 -
{{{PvdA,V V D}, SP},D66} 102 - 5 7 4 9 -
{{{PvdA,V V D},D66}, SP} 102 - 9 6 6 7 -
Simultaneous Procedure
GRL SP PvdA D66 VVD CDA
{PvdA,V V D} 83 - - 3 - 1 -
{PvdA,SP,V V D} 88 - 7 10 - 3 -
{PvdA,D66, V V D} 97 - 11 2 8 2 -
{PvdA,SP,D66, V V D} 102 - 3 9 3 8 -
In a similar way, we can argue that forming a coalition with a stronger partner is not advantageous,
since the stronger party may `pull' the position of a formed coalition more towards it's own ideal
position. Hence we propose hypothesis 3b: Increase of a party's weight is disadvantageous for its
coalition partners.
One can show that forming a two-party coalition with a stronger party is never advantageous
to the coalition partner. The intuition is that in such a `zero-sum' situation, the larger party will
always be able to pull the coalition position to its own position, further away from its partner.
Nevertheless, it does not necessarily hold when forming a larger coalition. We can illustrate this
with the following theoretical example.
Example 2We consider the same situation as in Example 1 with party 1 being less ﬂexible, i.e.,
N = {1,2,3}, x∗1 = 0, x∗2 = 4, x∗3 =−2
r′1 = 3, r2 = r3 = 6, w1 =w2, w3 = 2w2
M ′1 = [−3,3], M2 = [−2,10], M3 = [−8,4]
M ′1 ∩M2 =M ′1 ∩M2 ∩M3 = [−2,3]
As calculated in Example 1, the coalition position y{{1,2},3} results from the step-by-step procedure
of forming {{1,2},3}, in which ﬁrst parties 1 and 2 form a coalition, and then party 3 joins, is equal
to y{{1,2},3} =− 14 . Next, let us assume that the weight of party 1 increases: it is twice as big as the
weight of party 2 and the same as the weight of party 3, i.e.,
w′1 = 2w2 =w3
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The remaining components of the model remain unchanged. We consider the same step-by-step
procedure of forming {{1,2},3}. The new negotiation positions z{1,2}1 , z{1,2}2 , and coalition positions
z{1,2}, z{{1,2},3} are now the following:
z
{1,2}
1 = x
∗
1 = 0, z
{1,2}
2 = 3, z{1,2} = 1∈M3
z{{1,2},3} =−15
Comparing the distance between coalition position y{{1,2},3} and the ideal point x∗2 of party 2 and
the distance between the new coalition position z{{1,2},3} and x∗2, one can conclude that
z{{1,2},3} 2 y{{1,2},3}
It means that an increase of the weight of party 1 makes party 2 better oﬀ.
This gives the following result.
Result 3b: When forming a k-party coalition, for k≥ 3, an increase of a party's weight may be an
advantage for its coalition partner.
In order to show a pure eﬀect of an increase of a party's weight in Example 2, somewhat artiﬁcially
we have increased the weight of party 1, keeping all remaining elements unchanged. This is of
course not what happens in a parliament, since elections (usually) preceding coalition formation
ﬁx the weights of the parties. However, it can be used by parties deﬁning a coalition formation
strategy before elections. For example, in its campaign a party may be less negative with respect
to another party whose bigger size might be beneﬁcial. Nevertheless, although we believe that
this result is mainly of a theoretical nature, we have also constructed an instance using the data.
Consider the case of Table 3.7 that presents the 1998 data with varying ﬂexibility for the parties
taking the real number of seats. The distance of the ideal of D66 to the compromise of coalition
{{{PvdA,SP},D66}, V V D} is 52.25. Let us now hypothetically assume that SP increases its weight
by 30, while the other parties keep their original weights. Now the distance of the ideal of D66 to
the coalition position becomes 51.53. This means its position improves due to an increase of another
party.
4. Conclusions
In spite of the many unwritten laws and traditions during coalition formation in countries as Italy,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Ireland, political parties should be aware of the im-
portant role of the process of coalition formation. In this paper, we have shown how several aspects
of this coalition process play an important role for the result of the coalition negotiations. We use
a formal model of coalition formation which considers political parties as players with ideal pol-
icy positions and maneuvering spaces denoting their ﬂexibility to deviate from their ideal points.
The output of the model is a set of feasible coalitions, which have a majority and whose members'
maneuvering spaces overlap. The model describes which coalition position will be reached by the
members given the procedure adopted. The complexity of the model increases with the number of
players (parties) and policy dimension.
To generate coalitions from political data, algorithms have been presented. We have introduced
computational algorithms for the diﬀerent procedures. The algorithms compute all winning coali-
tions and preferences of parties over those coalitions. Furthermore, the algorithms are used to test
diﬀerent hypotheses.
The analysis in de Ridder et al. (2007) focused on three aspects of coalition formation and
formulated hypotheses: procedure, ﬂexibility, and power sharing. The following questions which
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political parties may (and should) take into account when forming a coalition were under study:
Does procedure of coalition negotiations matter? Is it more advantageous to be a ﬁrst-mover in
the coalition process? Is it better to be more or less ﬂexible in coalition formation? Should we
invite more parties to join to a (minimal) winning coalition or is it better to stay with the existing
one(s)? Is it better to form a coalition with a stronger party or rather with a smaller one? Applying
the algorithms to Dutch data and using theoretical results, we have arrived at several (counter-
)examples. These counter-examples have shown the importance of the process and give important
implications for political parties involved in coalition formation. Also, these results have implications
for future coalition research.
From the output of the applied methods the following can be observed. First, procedure matters.
When forming a coalition, political parties should be aware of the important role procedure plays
in determining the result of the coalition. The calculations have shown that procedure partly deter-
mines which coalition point is agreed on. However, earlier research has analyzed that there is not
one procedure which is always best (de Ridder and Rusinowska (2005)).
Related to procedure, being a ﬁrst mover is not necessarily advantageous. This result is also
surprising in the sense that in many countries (e.g. The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and
Austria) the tradition is that the largest party can start the negotiations and determines who
will negotiate ﬁrst. Being involved early in the process is considered an advantage. However, from
the model it appeared that this is not always the case. The rationale here is that, by studying
coalition compromises the other coalition partners will reach without a party (assuming complete
information), this party can estimate whether this compromise is close to its ideal position. If it is,
it may pay to join later. If the compromise is not close, it may be better for the party to join earlier
in the process.
With respect to ﬂexibility, being less ﬂexible is not necessarily advantageous. In the data, we have
found that being less ﬂexible results in a (pre-)coalition compromise which is closer to a party's
position. So, being less ﬂexible pays oﬀ. Nevertheless, we have presented a theoretical three-party
counter-example in which being less ﬂexible is a disadvantage. In this example, the ﬁrst mover's
ideal position was somewhere between the ideal position of the remaining two parties. Although
being less ﬂexible gave a better pre-coalition outcome, the ﬁnal coalition position was worse for the
party than the coalition position with the party being more ﬂexible.
Related to power sharing theories (as minimal winning theory), computations show that forming
a minimal winning coalition is not necessarily advantageous. Moreover, forming a coalition with a
stronger party is not necessarily disadvantageous. So, it might pay oﬀ to share power with more and
stronger parties than predicted by power sharing theory. To explain this counter-intuitive ﬁnding,
for the minimal winning case it holds that new parties may determine a ﬁnal coalition outcome
closer to a party's ideal position, although this depends on the ideal positions of the new parties.
For the stronger partner case, a stronger party joining usually moves the pre-coalition compromise
further from a party's own ideal position. However, a strong party may determine a ﬁnal coalition
position which is closer to a party's position. In that case, a strong partner may be beneﬁcial to
cooperate with.
Game theoretic models like the coalition formation model allows analysis only for few player
situations. The developed computational methods allow empirical testing of hypotheses using huge
data sets with many players. We have provided theoretical examples and empirical cases which
conﬁrm the thesis that the coalition process matters. We aim to reach the agenda of coalition research
with this message. Due to the focus on making and illustrating this message, we have neglected other
aspects of the research. We suggest for future research to investigate how to empirically determine
a party's ﬂexibility, development of more dynamic coalition models, and empirical analyses of more
countries.
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